

Intentionality and the public world: Husserl's treatment of objectivity in the Cartesian Meditations

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The fifth and final meditation of Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* has been the subject of a great deal of attention over the years. A number of commentators have focused on Husserl's treatment of the experience of other subjects there and the majority of them have been quite critical. What is not often remarked on, however, is that Husserl's initial intention at least in the Fifth Meditation is to address another topic, one that he evidently considers to be of even greater urgency.¹ This topic comprises what Husserl calls "transcendental problems pertaining to the *Objective World*."² This topic is an urgent one, he tells us, because unless such problems can be solved his phenomenology remains open to "what may seem to be a grave objection."³

This objection is essentially an objection to Husserl's philosophical method itself. The key feature of this method, the implementation of the transcendental epoche, requires one to abstain from deciding or even considering whether the objects of conscious processes – the things we see, remember, imagine, etc. – actually exist. This ontological agnosticism leads to an exclusive focus on the relations holding between the mind and its objects, or on intentionality, that propensity of consciousness to be, as Husserl expresses it, consciousness *of* something.

However, as Husserl seems to realize at this point in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the transcendental epoche could also be seen to have another more alarming consequence. Husserl recognizes that perceptual objects at least are invariably experienced as public or as part of a world that one shares with others who experience it in much the same way. Nor does he want to deny that notable among the objects one encounters in this world are other conscious subjects. The problem is that implementing the transcendental epoche seems to require that one abstain from assenting to the actual existence of other subjects, which makes it very difficult to explain how perceptual objects are known to be experienced by others. The question is: without appeal to the existence of other conscious subjects who experience

them, how can the public character of perceptual objects, what Husserl here calls their objectivity, be accounted for?

This is the transcendental problem of the objective world – what I shall call the problem of objectivity. It must be noted that Husserl's use of the term 'objective' here is somewhat unusual. From the way he handles the topic in the Fifth Meditation it is clear that at this point he equates the objectivity of perceptual objects with their publicity. A perceptual object is objective, then, if it can in principle be perceived by more than one subject. (For the purposes of this paper I shall use the terms objectivity and publicity interchangeably.) The usual practice in philosophy, of course, is to equate the objective with what is 'really there'. However, it is just the consideration of this sort of objectivity that is ruled out by Husserl's deployment of the transcendental epoche. For this reason, Husserl's equation of objectivity with publicity at this point is explainable, if not wholly consistent with his treatment of the subject elsewhere.

The objection that can be levelled against Husserl's philosophical method, then, is that it renders Husserl's phenomenology unable to account for this type of objectivity. Husserl apparently sees this objection to be a serious challenge to his philosophy. In other places in his work Husserl explains that he calls his phenomenology *transcendental* phenomenology precisely because it concerns itself with the puzzle of how the objects of experience transcend experience.⁴ That objects can be perceived by others besides oneself guarantees that they transcend the workings of one's own consciousness. Hence Husserl feels he must be able to explain how we are aware that objects transcend our awareness of them in this way (without jettisoning the transcendental epoche, of course) in order to make good on his claim to be engaged in transcendental philosophy.

In this paper I will show that Husserl fails to overcome this objection in the Fifth Meditation because the solution he presents there to the problem of objectivity is unsatisfactory. Despite this failure, however, it is not true that an understanding of objectivity, as Husserl conceives it here, is beyond the reach of his phenomenology. I will argue that Husserl failed to come up with a satisfactory solution because, having fallen momentarily under the spell of a misguided and non-phenomenological model of the mind, he conceived of the problem in entirely the wrong way. Secondly, I will show that if one conceives of it in the right way, the problem does not require the complex treatment Husserl devotes to it in the *Cartesian Meditations*. In his previous book, the *Ideas*, he presents an analysis of perception that can easily be extended to guarantee this type of objectivity, even though he does not directly address the issue there.

1.

The Fifth Meditation goes on to concern itself with an analysis of intersubjectivity, or the intentional relation between myself and other subjects, because the strategy that Husserl adopts to reply to the above objection is to attempt to draw other subjects themselves within the bounds of the transcendental epoche. This proves to be a tricky business, for it is unclear whether the true otherness of the other can be accommodated this way. His phenomenological explanation for how I come to recognize that others are conscious subjects like myself bears a curious resemblance to the old argument from analogy offered as a solution to the classical other minds problem. It is the similarities between the physical bodies of others and my own physical body that originally triggers this recognition, according to Husserl. Due to a complex intentional process based on my grasp of these similarities I actually become aware in a backhanded way of the subjectivity of others, he claims. Their psyches or consciousnesses, although not directly perceived, are 'appresented' to me along with their physical bodies.

I will not mention here the many criticisms that can and have been made of Husserl's treatment of intersubjectivity. A great deal has been written on this topic already.⁵ What is interesting and more germane to the topic at hand is how Husserl uses his analysis of the experience of other subjects as a basis for his treatment of objectivity. After all, Husserl himself appears to think that it is the problem of accounting for objectivity that presents the foremost challenge to his transcendental phenomenology.

Husserl attempts to overcome the objection that phenomenology cannot account for the objectivity of perceptual objects by means of a further claim. Not only am I able to apprehend the psyches of others in the manner alluded to above, he contends, I am also able to achieve a mediated awareness of what others actually experience of objects in the world. To support this claim he emphasizes how I can always project myself into the position of another and imagine the way that the objects I am looking at from this perspective look like from another's perspective. If I am aware of what others experience of objects in this way, his reasoning goes, I am aware that these objects can be experienced by other conscious subjects.

Although this claim has not often been singled out for attention by commentators, it is at least as questionable as Husserl's initial claims about the identification of other subjects in the Fifth Meditation.⁸ Indeed, it does not stand up to close scrutiny on two counts.

For one thing, such a claim flirts with paradox. If I really could become aware of what others experience, if I could share their perceptions of the world, what could serve to differentiate their consciousness from my own?

They would not really be other subjects at all, but merely appendages of my own consciousness. Husserl himself realizes he runs the risk of falling into this paradox, but the elaborate means he takes to avoid it do not succeed.⁷

In the second place, his contention that I am aware not only of other conscious subjects, but of what they are actually conscious *of* is plainly counter-intuitive. It is actually very rarely, if ever, the case that I am aware of what the world looks like from another's perspective. Indeed rarely even do people make the attempt to achieve this sort of insight (although the world might be a better place if they did). Deciding just what sides, what particular features another sees of an object would require, in actuality, an enormous amount of thought and attention.

For these two reasons the particular solution that Husserl offers in the *Cartesian Meditations* to the problem objectivity poses to his phenomenology does not succeed. If this proposed solution does fail, it appears that the threat he sees to the ultimate legitimacy of his philosophical project remains, for he feels that his phenomenology must be able to account for the public character of perceptual objects in order to really merit the title transcendental phenomenology. Before giving up the ship at this point, however, it is important, I suggest, to look at the problem itself more closely. A close examination reveals, I will show, that Husserl's understanding of the task he is facing at this juncture is undermined by some illicit and entirely gratuitous assumptions he makes about the nature of perception and the mind.

A clear indication that Husserl misconceived the nature of the problem of objectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations* can be found in the solution to it Husserl provides. It is only necessary to ask: what is it that Husserl thinks that the access to the experiences of others he postulates contributes in terms of his phenomenological analysis of objectivity? Explicitly Husserl states that access to the 'appresented' experiences of others enables one to layer a higher and more complex level of meaning (*Sinn*) on top of a more rudimentary fundamental grasp of the world. This additional layer of meaning provides objects with the sense of being objective or there for other conscious subjects.

Husserl frequently uses this sort of geological metaphor when speaking of meaning and sense. In this case, however, it acts as a subtle subterfuge. Access to the experiences of others, even if it were possible, could not be the source of an additional level of meaning such as this one. Meaning is simply not rooted in individual subjects in this way. It is true that Husserl comes up with the idea of a private sphere of meaning here in the *Cartesian Meditations* (the notorious *Eigenheitssphäre*), but Wittgensteinian-type arguments can be marshalled to demonstrate that such an idea is nonsensical if not self-contradictory.⁹ It cannot be meanings, or as Husserl puts it,

sense formations (*Sinnbildungen*), that are contributed by access to the experiences of others.

It is significant that at other points in the Fifth Meditation Husserl speaks in a very different way. My experience of others, he says, enables me to grasp that the world that appears to them is the same world that appears to me:

It is implicit in the sense of my successful apperception of others that their world, the world belonging to their appearance systems (*Erscheinungssysteme*), must be experienced forthwith as the same as the world belonging to my appearance systems, and this involves an identity of our appearance systems.⁹

The identity of these appearance systems – those of others and my own – must of necessity be a qualitative rather than a numerical identity, though. As Husserl expresses it at another point in the *Cartesian Meditations*: “And yet each has his experiences, his appearance and appearance-unities, his world phenomenon.”¹⁰ Unlike meanings or sense-formations, these systems of appearances seem to be rooted in or confined to individual subjects.

These few references to appearances in the *Cartesian Meditations* give an important hint as to what Husserl is attempting to accomplish there by means of his theory of how we experience others. As I reconstruct this line of thought, my mediated awareness of the experiences of others would provide me with access to their “appearance systems”. And it is access to the “appearance systems” of others that is required in order to insure objectivity.

It is not obvious in the text that Husserl is conceiving of the problem of objectivity in exactly this way. The term ‘appearance’ does not occur too often in the *Cartesian Meditations*. It does occur frequently, on the other hand, in certain passages from an earlier work, the manuscript of the second volume of *Ideas* which was published only after Husserl’s death. There he is concerned not so much with appearance systems as with the individual appearances of objects that different subjects ‘have’. At one point he states explicitly: “But the other can never at the same time with me (in the originary experiential content ascribed to him) have the same appearances that I have. My appearances belong to me, his to him.”¹¹ (Hua IV, 169).

Why and how do my appearances “belong to me”? Of course, there is one obvious reason why another cannot at the same time have the same appearance of an object that I have. We cannot both occupy the same place at the same time. But the necessary spatial differentiation between different subjects does not appear to be the crucial factor for Husserl. In *Ideen II*, he states that even if two people could occupy the same place at the same time, as in the case of Siamese twins, they would still have two distinct appearances of the same object.¹² The implication is that I cannot in principle,

not only in fact, have the same appearances of an object another 'has'.

Although it only operates below the surface in the *Cartesian Meditations*, it is this conception of appearances as belonging to individual subjects that determines both the solution that Husserl comes up with to the problem of objectivity and, more importantly, his formulation of the problem itself. According to the picture that really underlies Husserl's attempted solution it is not different levels of meaning that are supplied via the 'appresented' experiences of others, but rather the different appearances of objects that each subject 'has'. It can only be because Husserl feels he needs to establish a connection between the appearance of an object that I have and the necessarily distinct appearance of it that another subject has, that he is led to posit some sort of access to the experiences of others.

One can certainly see how if one subscribes to such a conception of appearances there definitely is a problem in establishing the objectivity of the objects the appearances are appearances of. Since this conception of appearances did not originate with Husserl (it is arguably the most venerable distinction in the history of philosophy), this same problem has arisen in many philosophical contexts. If I cannot in principle have the same appearance of an object another has, a gap is opened for all sorts of epistemological questions. How do I know whether the appearances of objects that others have are at all similar to mine? How can I even know whether another has any appearances of objects at all?¹³ Husserl makes the bold and original move of cutting through all such epistemological uncertainties by simply declaring that, although I cannot have the appearances of objects that others have, they are presented to me in some quite peculiar mediate way whenever I experience others.

It is peculiar to see this remnant of traditional philosophical thought surfacing in Husserl's work in this way. And I certainly do not mean to imply that this conception of appearances which I have briefly detailed here is an explicit principle of Husserl's phenomenology. There is even good evidence, in *Ideen II* and elsewhere, that Husserl was attempting to fight his way free from this way of thinking.¹⁴ I am arguing, however, that at least at the time he wrote the *Cartesian Meditations*, this conception was operating in the background of his thought. Perhaps he was not even consciously aware of its influence. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, a certain *picture* held him captive.

2.

Indeed, the conception of appearances which, I have argued, surreptitiously influenced Husserl's treatment of objectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations* cannot be consistently incorporated within Husserl's phenomenology, for

its runs counter to certain basic tenets of Husserl's general theory of intentionality. The discrepancy can be seen most clearly when one considers one of the most important features of this theory: Husserl's concepts of the noesis and noema first introduced in the *Ideas* published in 1913. The noesis and noema represent, according to Husserl, the two essential aspects of all intentional acts, perception included.

What Husserl designates as the noetic aspect of experience, or as noesis, is the strictly subjective component of intentionality. He points out that in so far as each single experience or intentional act takes its place in turn within the overall sequence of my experience, it is a unique personal event. Though an experience can also be dated in relation to public events, this fact is incidental as far as this particular point of view is concerned. What matters is that each occupies an instant of "internal time-consciousness."¹⁵

However, it is the second aspect of consciousness, its noematic component, that allows it to be, as it usually is, consciousness *of* something. It is consciousness *of* something because, as Husserl puts it in the *Ideas*: "it is its essential nature to conceal 'meaning' within itself."¹⁶ Consciousness bears meaning 'within itself' because, although the objects of consciousness have meaning, this meaning cannot arise from within the objects themselves, but rather must be contributed by the subject. These meanings, which Husserl designates noemata, are what allows one to identify and re-identify objects of perception, memory, imagination, and more conceptual modes of thought as what they are, or rather, exactly what they are experienced as being.

Clearly the functions of the noema and the noesis are interdependent. Yet the distinction Husserl makes between them is of the utmost importance. For my purposes, I want to stress only one major difference between them: while each noesis is, as I stressed, absolutely unique, one noema can be shared by different intentional acts.¹⁷

In order to explicate the relation between the noema and the full range of intentional acts, Husserl goes on to differentiate different components of the noema. He notes, for instance, that one and the same object can be presented in quite different kinds of intentional acts. For instance, I can perceive a particular tree or I can imagine or remember it or make judgments about it. In all these cases, what Husserl calls the object '*simpliciter*' is there and some aspect of the noema pertaining to the tree is preserved. Husserl uses the term noematic nucleus to refer to this central persisting element of meaning. In the full noema, on the other hand, what kind of an intentional act is involved is taken into account. Whether an act is an act of perception or memory, etc., is, in certain respects, a matter of its noetic aspect, but what is presented in these different acts is correlatively affected. The tree as remembered is different in principle than the tree as it is actually perceived.

In addition to this distinction between the full noema (the tree as remembered) and the noematic nucleus (the tree whether remembered or perceived or imagined, etc.), Husserl makes a further distinction between the noematic correlate of the object ‘*simpliciter*’ and how and in what particular determinate ways the objects is grasped or given (“*der Gegenstand im Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten*”).¹⁸ This second component of the noema he designates the noematic *Sinn*. A noematic *Sinn*, then, cannot correspond to more than one object, although one object can accumulate varying noematic *Sinne*.¹⁹ It is this concept of the noematic *Sinn* which is most germane to the problem of objectivity, since it concerns the publicity of perceptual objects, which are always perceived in some particular determinate way.

I offer the following example to help elucidate Husserl’s concepts of the noesis, noema and noematic *Sinn*. On a spring day I look up and out my living room window at the flowering apple tree that is growing in my front yard. My perceiving of the tree is a momentary event, or, according to Husserl’s terminology, an instance of noesis. Yet I can perceive this same tree looking just this exact way on many different occasions. For instance, I could walk to the kitchen and then return to the living room and see it again. The same noema, and in this case the same noematic *Sinn* relating to the tree as seen from this perspective, is present on each occasion.

Now imagine that my neighbor who lives across the yard from me also at the same moment of this spring day looks out his living room window and sees the same flowering apple tree. Of course, he sees it from a somewhat different angle (one of its limbs is missing on this side, say, because it was struck by lightning). Although he sees the same tree I do, “the self-same intentional object”, in Husserl’s terms, the “perceived tree as such” is different in his case, so the noematic *Sinn* determining the noema is a different one.

Husserl’s theory of the roles of the noesis, noema and noematic *Sinn* in perception presented in the *Ideas* conflicts radically with any conception of appearances such as the one that, I argued, undermined Husserl’s approach to objectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations*.²⁰ For one thing, in the *Ideas* Husserl rejects the idea put forward by thinkers such as his former teacher Brentano that what consciousness is conscious of is a ‘mental’, ‘intentional’, or ‘immanent’ object.²¹ What I am conscious of in the case of perception, he forcefully asserts, are the things that are there to be perceived. Such a position would seem to preclude making any distinction between appearances and the objects they are appearances of. What could an appearance of an object be construed to be except just such an immanent object?

However, Husserl’s theory of intentionality is not a direct realism. It is Husserl’s conception of the role of the noema in perception that distin-

guishes his approach from all previous theories of perception. As commentators have emphasized, Husserl's innovation was to take what is usually thought of as a linguistic concept – meaning – and apply it to perception.²² The noematic *Sinne* involved in perception are perceptual meanings, as their name indicates. Meanings are intersubjective, unlike appearances, which Husserl evidently conceives to be private.²³ When Husserl speaks about appearances in *Ideen II* he denies that another can have the same appearance of an object at the same time that I do. A noema, on the other hand, even in its most fully determinate incarnation as the noematic *Sinn*, certainly could be found at work in the perceptual acts of different subjects at the same time.

To understand how this statement can be true, one has only to think back to my previous example. When my neighbor stands in his living room and looks at the flowering apple tree the noematic *Sinn* which is involved in his intentional act is definitely distinct from the noematic *Sinn* found in my perception of the tree as it looks at the same moment from my living room window. However, I can always invite my neighbor over to my house and we can both stand in my living room and look at the flowering apple tree. In this case, I contend, the exact same noematic *Sinn* would be at work in his perceiving of the tree as in mine.

The noematic *Sinn* would be the same because we would both see not only the same tree but the same tree in exactly the same fully determinate way. The fact that we stand one or two feet away from each other and to that extent have different perspectives on it could in no way affect how the tree actually looks to each of us. If the slightest variation in body posture, say, were to call for the introduction of another noematic *Sinn*, then the number of noematic *Sinne* would approach infinity, individuating them would be in principle impossible and the concept would lose its usefulness as a method of explaining the meaningfulness of perception.

If one noematic *Sinn* can inform the perceptual acts of different subjects at the same time, it is obviously distinct from what Husserl means by an appearance. To think in terms of private appearances distinct from the public objects they are appearances of makes solving the problem of objectivity facing Husserl insurmountably difficult. Therefore this way of conceiving of the problem should be dropped in favor of an approach centering on the role of the noema in perception. Once the influence of what I have identified as the picture underlying Husserl's approach to the problem of objectivity in the *Cartesian Meditations* is dissipated, the problem itself is dissolved. Establishing that objects can be experienced as public or there for all becomes far simpler than Husserl seemed to think it was.

The argument is simple: whenever the experiences of different subjects

can be said to share the same noematic *Sinn*, it must be the case that these different subjects perceive the same object in the world.

1. The same noematic *Sinn* can be at work in my perceptual act and someone else's perceptual act at the same time.
2. To each noematic *Sinn* corresponds one and only one intentional object.
3. If the noematic *Sinn* in my perceptual act and another's perceptual act is the same, and if only one object can correspond to this noematic *Sinn*, then the object we are aware of must be the same.

It could be objected that this proposed solution to the problem of objectivity facing Husserl's phenomenology only works in a very limited number of cases. It is not always the case that my neighbor and I are standing together in my living room admiring the flowering apple tree. He could be viewing it, as I mentioned earlier, from his living room window. Or there could be no one else around to see it at the moment. I can even imagine a situation in which I could be the only person who would ever see a particular tree. Yet in all these cases I always experience the tree to be a public object. How can Husserl's phenomenology account for this fact, without recourse to any appeals to convictions about the actual existence of the tree?

My reply is that if this proposed solution to the problem of objectivity works in even one case, it is enough for my purposes here. At the beginning of the Fifth Meditation it is the very possibility of objectivity or the publicity of perceptual objects that is in question. As I discussed earlier, Husserl is concerned to counter the charge that this important aspect of our experience is rendered inexplicable or somehow cancelled out by the implementation of the transcendental epoche. My claim is that Husserl's theory about the role of the noema in perception insures the possibility of objectivity, even given the constraints of the transcendental epoche. Indeed, it is the transcendental epoche that reveals the role of perceptual meanings or noemata in perception. It is the mediating role that such perceptual meanings play in our experiences of objects that makes objectivity possible, even though once one assumes the phenomenological viewpoint the transcendental reduction prohibits one from assenting to the actual existence of these objects.

In those cases in which there are not two subjects who share the same view of an object, and thus the same noematic *Sinn*, I think that the key to constructing a phenomenological account of objectivity lies in Husserl's concept of the internal horizon of the object. Husserl observes that contained in one's present perception of one side of an object is a 'horizon' of other possible perceptions of other sides of it. For example, when I am

standing in my living room looking at the apple tree I have a sense of what the sides other than the side I am looking at look like. It is possible to interpret this horizon to refer to the possible perceptions of an object that other possible subjects might have.²⁴ This interpretation of Husserl's concept of the internal horizon of the object could be used to explain how, even when I am in fact the only person perceiving an object, I have the conviction that other people could see it and even some sense of what they would see if they did. Obviously this explanation of the experience of this aspect of objectivity requires further elaboration, more elaboration than I can give here.

In any case, the approach towards objectivity I have sketched out renders as a consequence a certain amount of Husserl's exposition in the *Cartesian Meditations* superfluous. It is no longer necessary to make the claim Husserl does that one has access somehow to others' experiences – a fortunate turn of events, for such a claim, I have argued, simply cannot be supported. Indeed, the problem of accounting for objectivity can be detached from the problem that other subjects present for Husserl's phenomenology. The possibility of an awareness of a public world is assured even before a phenomenological clarification of our experience of other subjects is attempted. Finally, the legitimacy of Husserl's transcendental project does not stand or fall, as he seems to think it does, on the success of his handling of the issue in the *Cartesian Meditations* – fortunately for Husserl, since, I have argued, his attempted solution to the problem of objectivity there fails.

Notes

1. David Carr is one of the few commentators who point out this fact. See David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 86–87.
2. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 89. Henceforth referred to as *CM*.
3. *Ibid.*
4. "From its pure eidetic standpoint which 'suspends' the transcendent in every shape and form, phenomenology comes inevitably on its own ground of pure consciousness to this whole system of *problems which are transcendental in the specific sense, and for this reason* it merits the title of *Transcendental Phenomenology*." Edmund Husserl, *Ideas* (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1976), p. 253. Henceforth referred to as *Ideas*. See also p. 285 and *CM*, p. 26.
5. See among others Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" in *Collected Papers III* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Michael Theunissen, *The Other*, trans. Christopher Macann, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984); Bernhard Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

6. Klaus Held, however, does criticize Husserl's handling of this issue at some length. See Klaus Held, "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie", in *Perspektiven transzendental-phänomenologischer Forschung*, ed. Ulrich Claesges and Klaus Held (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).
7. See *CM*, p. 109–111.
8. Two commentators who marshall such Wittgensteinian-type arguments against the notion of an *Eigenheitssphäre* are Edward G. Ballard, "Husserl's Philosophy of Intersubjectivity in Relation to his Rational Ideal," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, 11 (1962); and John Sallis, "On the Limitation of Transcendental Reflection, Or Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?" *The Monist* 55–2 (1971).
9. *CM*, p. 125.
10. *CM*, p. 91.
11. Henceforth referred to as *Ideen II*. See also p. 88.
12. See Hua IV, p. 205.
13. This last question is an epistemological version of the classical problem of other minds, while the first question lies at the source of such philosophical puzzles as that of the inverted spectrum.
14. See Hua IV, 168 and 206. In a manuscript fragment from 1922 Husserl writes: "... it can be asked, whether I must change, as I have already often considered, my old view still retained in the first draft of the *Ideen II*, to wit, that appearances belong to the "monads" and are not intersubjective as the realities themselves are, or rather, more to the point, cannot become intersubjective." The editor of this manuscript stresses that this reference applies to the first draft of the *Ideen II* written in 1912 and states that in a later draft from 1918 Husserl took the position suggested here, i.e. that appearances can become intersubjective. This hypothesis does not explain, however, why Husserl was still contemplating changing his mind on this issue in 1922, long after the first draft of *Ideen II* was set aside (Hua XIV, 250). Henceforth referred to as *I.S. Band II*.
15. "*Inneres Zeitbewusstsein*." See Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
16. *Ideas*, p. 251.
17. See *Ideas*, p. 274.
18. *Ideas*, p. 366.
19. "... not only has every meaning [*Sinn*] its "object", but varying meanings refer to the same object." *Ideas*, p. 367.
20. Therefore I disagree wholeheartedly with Aron Gurwitsch when he claims that the way Husserl uses the term appearance it is synonymous with the perceptual noema. See Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), pp. 183–184.
21. *Ideas*, p. 262.
22. See Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of *Noema*", Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Husserl's Perceptual *Noema*" and Aron Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness", all in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1982). See also David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982).

23. Gurwitsch explicitly says that the noema is intersubjective: "Every particular meaning or noema as an identical entity can be considered as objective in contrast to the multiple subjective acts that are correlated with it, especially if it is remembered that those acts may be distributed among a plurality of persons." He sees Husserl's conception of the noema as a meaning inherent in all intentional acts to have an explicit connection to the role of meaning in language use and the meanings apprehended through language are, indeed must be accessible to others. Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness," p. 69. Dagfinn Føllesdal interprets the noema along the lines of a concept. As a concept it would also have to be intersubjective, although he does not explicitly say this. See Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of Noema."
24. This interpretation is not entirely without precedence. In a manuscript fragment from the early 1920's, for instance, Husserl explicitly interprets the internal horizon in this way: "Thus each object that stands before my eyes in experience and above all in perception has an apperceptive horizon of possible experiences, one's own and others." (Hua XIV, 289, see also 420). It is true that Husserl usually speaks as though the horizon refers to other possible perception that I could have of an object, but my interpretation is preferable in several ways. After all, I cannot be two places at once and the horizon of other possible perceptions of an object are contained in my *present* perception of it. And I experience even objects that I am wholly unfamiliar with, and must remain unfamiliar with, as public objects. Furthermore, in my interpretation the other possible perceptions of the object contained in its internal horizon are the perceptions not of other actual subjects, but other possible subjects. This explains how I experience even objects that in fact no one else will ever see as public, while Husserl's account of objectivity in the Fifth Meditation cannot. To speculate even further, I think that this interpretation of the internal horizon of the object can serve to connect a particular noematic *Sinn* of an object and its noematic nucleus. It could begin to explain how when my neighbor looks at the apple tree from his living room window while I look at it from mine, I am aware we are looking at the same apple tree, even though the noematic *Sinne* involved are different.