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To cite this article: Kristana Arp (1993) An Alternative Husserlian Account of the other, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 24:3, 204-213, DOI: [10.1080/00071773.1993.11007023](https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1993.11007023)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1993.11007023>



Published online: 21 Oct 2014.



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AN ALTERNATIVE HUSSERLIAN ACCOUNT OF THE OTHER

KRISTANA ARP

In his *Cartesian Meditations* published in 1931 Edmund Husserl attempted to answer the basic question: on what basis do I identify others as conscious beings like myself? His answer, most briefly put, is that I perceive the physical similarities between the bodies of others and my own body and through projecting myself into their place achieve an awareness of them as perceptual subjects. Commentators have rejected this theory on a number of grounds.¹ However, no one, to my knowledge, has attempted to develop an alternative to this view which both makes sense and is consistent with Husserl's phenomenology as a whole. In this paper I will present such an alternative phenomenological account of the experience of the other based on an interpretation of the key concepts of kinaesthesia, motivation and the body as expression developed in other parts of Husserl's work.

Notably, I will draw from Husserl's treatment of both the other and perception found in the second volume of his *Ideas*. An excellent English translation of this work, which was left in manuscript form at Husserl's death, has recently been published.² The concepts I focus on are drawn from the third section of the work where Husserl analyses the world that is the subject of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or the human sciences. But I intend to expand these concepts in order to capture the most general and fundamental way we experience others.³

In his *Cartesian Meditations* account Husserl also makes a claim as to the most basic and fundamental way that other subjects are experienced. In the German language there are two words for body: *Körper*, which refers to both animate and inanimate entities and *Leib*, which is used solely of a living organism. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl claims that others are experienced at the most primary level as mere physical bodies or *Körper*. (This is what the reduction to the *Eigenheitssphäre* proposed there is designed to reveal.) Husserl goes on to explain how others are ultimately experienced as living functioning organisms or *Leiber*. It is just that this level of the experience of others is not primary, according to his scheme.

I hold instead that others are experienced at the most fundamental level precisely as living functioning organisms or *Leiber*. Space does not permit me to argue against Husserl here. I want only to mention that I do not deny that it is possible to regard the body of another subject merely as a *Körper* or physical object like any other. In order to do so, one need only abstract from the features that body displays that enables one to identify it as a living body. However, this sort of abstraction from the 'living' features of the body in question presupposes a prior grasp of that body as a living body. In this paper I want to explore how this prior grasp of the other as a living body is

arrived at.

A. *Kinaesthesia and Motivation*

The question I am addressing is: how is the body of the other identified as a living body or *Leib*? My answer is that it is identified as a living body because it displays kinaesthesia. To display kinaesthesia means that one's movements are structured in terms of what Husserl calls motivation: they are motivated by objects and are directed towards them or motivate them in turn.

It is strange, I know, to talk of a body displaying kinaesthesia. For as the Greek the term was taken from suggests and as the term is used in psychology and medicine, kinaesthesia is the sensation of bodily movement, which is something internal and cannot be 'displayed'. Husserl himself originally used the term in this sense.⁴ But as Husserl began to appropriate the term for his own phenomenological uses it took on a new meaning. In his later works it no longer designates the sensation of movement but rather the actual movements that are involved in perception itself, for example, turning one's head in order to see, moving one's ear closer in order to hear, moving one's hand in order to feel, etc.⁵ Under this usage of the term, each person directly experiences her own kinaesthesia, but awareness of the kinaesthesia of others is not ruled out. To say that a body displays kinaesthesia means only that its movements are understood to be the type of movements involved in perception. Husserl himself alludes to what I mean by this sort of understanding in the *Cartesian Meditations*: "the understanding of the limbs as hands functioning in touching and pushing, or as feet functioning in walking, of the eyes as functioning in seeing, etc."⁶

But how do we know that the movements the body of another makes are the sorts of movements that are involved in perception? We recognize these movements as kinaesthetic, I contend, because they have certain identifiable features. Specifically, they are structured in terms of what Husserl, again pioneering his own use of the term, calls motivation.

In ordinary usage, motivations are, like sensations of bodily movements, something internal to the subject (although, unlike sensations they can be shared with others). Husserl uses the term in a much more technical way to characterize the nature of perceptual relations. In what follows I will differentiate two ways Husserl that uses the concept of motivation in *Ideas II* and elsewhere to analyze the way bodily movements are connected to perception. In both these cases Husserl's choice of the term motivation is meant to distinguish the relation between bodily movements and perceptual objects from a causal relationship.

The first way that Husserl uses the concept of motivation is to capture the way that bodily movements lead to the perception of objects. Kinaesthesia, or the ongoing flow of these movements, always results in certain definite regularly predictable changes in the perceptual field. Husserl characterizes the relation between such movements and the resulting perceptual alterations as an "if-then" relation: if I turn my head to the right at this moment, for instance, then I see the picture hanging on the wall. This "if-then" relation

obtaining between these two phenomena is a relation of motivation: my turning my head motivates, in Husserl's terms, my seeing of the picture.

To conceive of this relation as a causal relation is inappropriate. First of all, bodily movements are not caused in the sense of determined or necessitated by other events. Kinaesthesia is experienced as voluntary, even if bodily movements are not usually directly willed.⁷ (I am excluding reflex motions from consideration here.) Husserl stresses the voluntary nature of kinaesthesia by emphasizing that most bodily movements are informed by a sense of 'I can', an underlying ever present conviction of the capacity for alternative movements. For example, while I am now moving my head in one direction in order to see the picture, I am aware at the same time that I can move it in another. And if kinaesthesia is voluntary, then perception, which is brought about by means of it, is voluntary too. Kinaesthetic movements, once undertaken, can always be checked and channeled in another direction. What I will see next is never determined or necessitated unless someone or something moves my body for me.

Yet, while the relation between kinaesthesia and perception is not a causal one, it is highly determinate and regular. When I turn my head, I expect to see the picture. At the same time, most of the other perceptual possibilities I constantly have available are temporarily ruled out. What I will see is in most cases 'mapped out ahead of time' (*vorgezeichnet*) by and thus dependent on my free kinaesthetic processes.⁸ Thus, kinaesthesia is voluntary while at the same time connected in a certain definite and determinable way with what one perceives of the world. This is what it means to say that kinaesthesia motivates perception.

This first conception of motivation is presented in different places in Husserl's work. However, it cannot immediately be incorporated into my explanation of how it is we identify others' movements as kinaesthetic without modification. The problem is that under this first conception of motivation this relation holds only between the bodily movements of the subject and its perceptions of the world. The nature of this connection can be observed constantly in my own case, but the observation of this relation in the case of others seems to be ruled out. While I can perceive the kinaesthesia of the other, perhaps, I certainly cannot perceive the perceptions of the other. How can I pick out this connection in the case of others if only one term in the relation, the bodily movements, can be observed?

The way to reformulate this conception to suit my purposes is to conceive of the relation it describes as holding not between bodily movements and the perceptions of objects but between bodily movements and the objects themselves. Put this way, my turning my head motivates not my perception of the picture on the wall but the picture itself as I perceive it. This seems a rather strange way of speaking, but it is not all that strange within a phenomenological context. For implementation of Husserl's transcendental reduction requires us to abstain from considering whether the objects we perceive actually exist. Thus the distinction between my perception of the picture and the picture I perceive becomes a purely formal one. In one sense,

the end result of perception is the object perceived, for the object is constituted in perception, to use Husserl's term: it is given meaning and thus an identity. To drop out the middle term – the perception – in the relation between bodily movements and perceptual objects is to a certain extent true to the spirit of Husserl's phenomenological enterprise in another way. In the first volume of his *Ideas*, Husserl warns against making the object of perception into an immanent object internal to consciousness as his teacher Brentano did.⁹ In perception we are conscious not of anything internal, but of the actual things that are there to be perceived, he asserts. Likewise, I want to emphasize, in kinaesthesia we are not related to our perceptions of the world but to the world itself through perception.

When this first conception of motivation that Husserl presents is reformulated in order to describe the relation between bodily movements and perceptual objects themselves, then the same type of relation can be observed in the case of others as in one's own case. I can sense how my own movements are directed towards objects and I perceive the movements of others to be directed towards them as well and in a distinctively different way than the motions of inanimate objects are related to other objects. The directedness these movements display signals to me that they are the type of movements involved in perception. And they are perceived to be spontaneous movements. The movements of others also exhibit the sense of 'I can' (or rather 'he or she can') that informs my own experience of my kinaesthesia.

A somewhat different conception of the relation of motivation is presented in the second volume of Husserl's *Ideas*. In this alternative conception of motivation, motivation is conceived to work in the opposite direction than in the first conception. Here, the objects experienced are described as motivating my kinaesthetic processes, rather than my kinaesthesia as motivating my experiences of the objects. An example of this type of motivation, related to the previous example, would be: the picture on the wall comes loose and falls to the floor, 'motivating' me to turn my head rapidly in that direction. With this concept of motivation Husserl tries to capture the way that an object can attract our attention and thus give rise to an impetus to turn towards it by means of various kinaesthetic movements. He speaks in this regard of the objects of experience as stimuli (*Reize*), but he is careful to distinguish his use of the term from the way it is used in neurophysiology, etc.¹⁰

Under this second conception, the relation of motivation is also distinguished from a causal relation. One reason this relation of motivation cannot be understood as a causal relation that Husserl points to is that it is the perceived qualities of the object that motivate kinaesthesia according to this conception, and these perceived qualities may or may not be identical with its actual properties. In Husserl's example, one may find a piece of food appetizing and be moved to taste it even though it might turn out that the food is spoiled or otherwise inedible. In a causal relation, only the real, not the merely apparent properties of an object can have causal efficacy. Husserl

stresses that the perceptual object is experienced in terms of human values; its causal properties are irrelevant in this context."

Furthermore, the second conception of motivation is like the first in that according to it the bodily movements involved in perception are voluntary and not causally determined. Just as in the first example the two events of my turning my head and seeing the picture need not happen, in the second example the sequence of the picture falling and my turning my head is not a necessary one either. Instead of looking at the picture, I may just wince and close my eyes.

Under this second conception of motivation, then, kinaesthesia is still voluntary; it is still informed by the underlying conviction of 'I can' do otherwise. What becomes more apparent in this case is how this feeling of 'I can' is many times linked up with what Husserl designates as a correlative sense of 'I do': I not only can look at the picture on the wall, in this instance I do look at it in order to see what has happened to it. Husserl says: "...the end of the process has the character of a goal."¹² This purpose behind my action is not what motivates kinaesthesia, however. To conceive of motivation in this way would be to conceive of it in the conventional way (which Husserl also does at one point in *Ideas II*, to make things more confusing). Rather it is the actual objects as they are perceived that motivate kinaesthesia, but this relation of motivation gives kinaesthesia a sense of purposefulness and a goal-directed structure.

The apparent difficulty with the first conception of the relation of motivation described by Husserl – that it is evident in my own case but not in the case of others – is not present with this second conception of motivation. If objects are seen as motivating kinaesthesia, then both terms in the relation, bodily movements and perceptual objects, are observable in the case of others. And we do perceive this relation between the movements of others and the world: we see them responding to events and objects. We might not fathom exactly why; an awareness of others' 'internal' states is not required for us to see this connection. We judge the actions of others to be purposeful even when we cannot tell just what their particular goals or purposes are, for we still perceive the goal-directed nature of their movements.

To sum up, this second conception of motivation can be placed beside my reformulation of the first conception in order to present a picture of how each of us is related to the world in perception. I initiate perception by directing myself towards objects; I also react to events and objects in an engaged fashion. This description of the relation between kinaesthesia and perceptual objects can be applied just as well in the case of others as in one's own case. I see others as spontaneously initiating perception of objects and responding to them in turn. At one point in *Ideas II* Husserl describes in his own words how others are experienced as related to the world through this relation of motivation:

That means that others are apprehended in analogy with one's own ego as subjects of a surrounding world of persons and things to which they comport themselves in their acts. They are "determined" by this surrounding world, or by the spiritual world that surrounds them and encompasses them, and, in turn, they exercise "determination" on it: they are

B. The Expressive Function of the Body

Yet the question I posed myself at the beginning of this paper – how does one come to identify the bodies of others as living functioning organisms or *Leiber* – can be pushed still one step further back. I answered that I identify them as such because they display kinaesthesia and I argued that others are seen to display kinaesthesia because their movements are directed towards and motivated by objects in the world. But how exactly is the fact that they stand in this particular relation to the world manifested by other subjects? To answer this question I want to turn to another interesting concept developed by Husserl in *Ideas II*, that of the living body as expression. And in exploring this concept I want to address briefly the issue of how what seem to be irreducibly subjective elements such as thoughts, feelings and motivations in the usual sense enter into a phenomenological account like the one I have proposed. With his concept of the living body as expression (*Leib* as *Ausdruck*) Husserl departs from the inherent dualism that can be discerned in many of his other treatments of the experience of others. Here he explicitly denies that the physical body and the soul of the other are experienced as two things fastened together in some way.¹⁴ Rather these two elements are experienced as fused together in a complex articulated unity which is animated by a particular sense.¹⁵ Husserl makes an analogy between the living body in its expressive function and the printed pages of a book. When I read a book, he points out, I am not conscious in any distinct manner of the actual physical marks on the page; they are certainly always present, but they are always experienced as transfused with sense or meaning. As he puts it: “I ‘live in the sense, comprehending it’.”¹⁶ The living body as a physical presence expresses a sense in the same way a printed text does.

The concept of the living body expressing a certain sense can be extended to explain how one comes to grasp that the other does stand in the relation to the world I have detailed so far. Taking up where Husserl left off in *Ideas II*, I contend that it is the kinaesthetic movements of others that serve as the mode of expression under this conception of the way others are experienced. And the ‘sense’ that is expressed through these movements is the particular way that another is connected to the world through the relation of motivation. To return to my previous example, altered slightly to fit this context: the picture hanging on the wall comes loose and crashes to the floor and my friend who is in the same room with me swivels her head to look at it. It is this event which ‘motivates’ her action and the riveting effect it has on her is expressed in her movements – not just *that* she moves her head, but the exact fashion in which she does so. By the same token, her movements express her free capacity to actively respond to her surroundings, to direct herself towards objects, thereby ‘motivating’ or bringing about the perception of them. The living body of the other expresses the particular relation to the world she stands in at that moment in this way.¹⁷

It is the case, however, that when Husserl uses the concept of the *Leib* as

expression in *Ideas II* that he implies that it is not just a connection with the world such as the one I have suggested that is expressed by the living body, but rather the spirit or soul itself. In peoples's smiles or frowns, their gestures and the cadence of their voices, he even says at one point: "is expressed the spiritual life of persons, their thinking, feeling, desiring, what they do and what they omit to do."¹⁸ Does this interpretation of what is expressed through the movements of the living body conflict with my account of how others are identified by means of their kinaesthetic movements?

First, I want to argue that recognizing that others have all these accoutrements of an inner life, thoughts, desires, intentions and motivations (the last two taken in their usual non-phenomenological sense) is not necessary in order to identify them as other subjects. What is necessary, I contend, is only to grasp that their movements are kinaesthetic, which means to grasp that they stand in a particular relation to the world which inanimate objects do not.

The case of animals serves to demonstrate my point. Husserl acknowledged that to a significant extent animals are experienced as subjects in the same way as humans are.¹⁹ Most importantly, animals, unlike inanimate objects, perceive the world. There is certainly no problem in understanding the movements of animals as kinaesthetic movements or the type of movements involved in perception. Ludwig Wittgenstein points to a good example of what I would call a threshold case in this regard:

Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. – One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a *sensation* to a *thing*? One might as well ascribe it to a number! – And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.²⁰

The wriggling of the fly is a very rudimentary form of kinaesthesia.

While animals do display kinaesthesia, it is not really appropriate to ascribe thoughts, emotions and values to them, although people often anthropomorphize animals, the higher animals at least. In the case of the lower animals to do so is clearly not appropriate. (It would be nonsensical to speak of the inner thoughts and desires of Wittgenstein's fly). In addition, we do not understand infants and mental defectives to have the same type of thought processes that we do. Yet in all these cases no one would want to deny that these particular creatures can easily be distinguished from inanimate objects or mere things. It must be the particular sort of animation that their bodies display, not our grasp of their thoughts and feelings, that allows us to do so.

So, it is not necessary to have any inkling of what Husserl calls another's spiritual life in order to grasp it to be a living creature. Nonetheless, it is the case that with most humans, at least, we commonly do ascribe thoughts, feelings, etc. to them. Indeed we often seem to be directly aware of these thoughts and feelings. How can my interpretation of Husserl's concept of the living body as a mode of expression for one's perceptual relation to the world do justice to this fact?

At this point the metaphor that Husserl constantly uses of experience as consisting of many layers or levels, each founding or founded upon the next can be called into use. My grasp of the basic perceptual relation that others have to the world always underlies the more complex ways in which I understand them. This basic sense expressed by the living bodies of others serves as the foundation for these other levels of understanding. For example, before I can begin to comprehend why another is upset by what she sees, I must grasp that she does see something. This basic level of awareness is the foundation on which any more complex understanding of the other, which can cover an enormous range of possibilities, is 'built up' intentionally in Husserl's phenomenological sense.

An understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others, then, is founded on (in the sense of presupposing, not necessarily following temporally upon) a more primary grasp of these others as kinaesthetic subjects. It is interesting that once one has a conception of the living body as expressive like the one Husserl develops in *Ideas II*, to speak of becoming aware of the thoughts and feelings of others does not necessarily involve the positing of some inner sphere where these thoughts and feelings reside. If the sense or the spirit that the living body expresses is truly one with its physical manifestation, then it is not hidden, not inaccessible to others, not really 'inner' at all. As Husserl puts it: "The facial expressions are seen facial expressions, and they are immediately bearers of sense indicating the other's consciousness..."²¹

That I do often feel myself to be aware of the thoughts and feelings of others by looking in their faces, then, does not conflict with my thesis that we come to identify others through the kinaesthetic movements they display. The thoughts and feelings of others are centered in their living bodies, and since their bodies are expressive, these so-called subjective phenomena are fused with their gestures and actions. The *Leib* or living body serves as a mode of expression for a very large range of ways in which subjects can be connected to the world. The relation to the perceptual world expressed through kinaesthesia, which I have described through an elaboration of Husserl's concept of motivation, is only, I claim, the most basic and most general way.

C. Conclusion

Readers have long been dissatisfied with the account of intersubjectivity Husserl published in his *Cartesian Meditations*. Yet this account is significant because it brings an interesting philosophical problem to light: how do I identify others as conscious beings like myself? That Husserl fails to satisfactorily answer the question there does not mean that Husserlian phenomenology entirely lacks the resources to do so. Indeed, Husserl's careful phenomenological analyses of the role of the body in perception found in the second volume of his *Ideas* and elsewhere are a rich source of ideas for constructing an alternative solution to the problem.

Husserl's concepts of kinaesthesia, motivation and the body as expression in particular can be used to explain how I understand others' bodies to be

living functioning organisms and am able to identify them as perceptual subjects. I do so because their bodies display kinaesthesia: the movements they make are the kinds of movements that are involved in perception. I know that they are these kinds of movements because they are related to objects and events in the world in a particular way that can be described as a relation of motivation. Finally, I am able to grasp this about their movements because their bodies express a sense of connectedness to the world that is the basis for all my subsequent understanding of them.²²

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1. See among others Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" in *Collected Papers III* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Michael Theunissen, *The Other*, Christopher Macann, trans. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984); Bernhard Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Klaus Held, "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie" in *Perspektiven transcendental-phänomenologischen Forschung*, ed. by Ulrich Claesges and Klaus Held (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); Edward G. Ballard, "Husserl's Philosophy of Intersubjectivity in Relation to his Rational Ideal," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, 11 (1962) and John Sallis, "On the Limitation of Transcendental Reflection, Or Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?" *The Monist* 55-2 (1971).
2. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, trans. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989). Henceforth referred to as *Ideas II*.
3. Husserl himself claims that the mode of experiencing the world that is the basis of the human sciences is more fundamental than the the perspective of the natural and animal sciences, but it is not certain what this priority is based on. See Kristana Arp, "Review of Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book*," *Husserl Studies*, 8-2 (1992).
4. See Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 13-14 and *Ding und Raum Vorlesungen 1907* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 161.
5. "We call these movements, which belong to the essence of perception and serve to bring the object of perception to givenness from all sides insofar as possible, *kinaesthesia*." Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 84. See also Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, David Carr, trans. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 106 where he equates kinaesthesia with the "ego's motility".
6. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969), p. 122. My translation.
7. It is true that in *Experience and Judgment* Husserl calls kinaesthetic acts active but involuntary. But he does so in order to downplay the free spontaneous nature of kinaesthetic processes in order to contrast the receptive quality of prepredicative experience to the productive nature of higher levels of thought. By involuntary here, I think, Husserl means not directly willed. I often turn my head, for instance, with no objective in mind or even without thinking about it. What is important and what Husserl acknowledges even here, is that I am always free to inhibit such movements. See Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 83-85, p. 251.
8. See Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 14.

9. See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas* (New York: Humanities Press Inc, 1976), p. 262.
10. See *Ideas II*, pp. 198-199 and p. 227. The German term *Reiz* also carries the connotation outside of a scientific context of charm or fascination and the related terms *reizen* and *anreizen* can mean to incite or induce or even to entice. Husserl undoubtedly is trying to reintegrate these connotations into his use of the word.
11. "The Object stimulates me in terms of its *experienced properties* and not its physicalistic ones, of which I need know nothing, and if I am acquainted with them, in truth that did not have to be... This is a new kind of subject-Object "effect". The Object has value qualities and is "experienced" as having them, is apperceived as value-Object." *Ideas II*, p. 228.
12. *Ideas II*, p. 228.
13. *Ideas II*, p. 240.
14. See *Ideas II*, p. 246 and p. 252.
15. "...the physical unity of the Body [*Leib*] there, which changes in such and such a way or is at rest, is *articulated* in multiple ways, in ways that are more determinate or less determinate according to the circumstances. And the articulation is one of *sense*, which means it is not of a kind that is to be found within the physical attitude..." *Ideas II*, p. 253.
16. *Ideas II*, p. 248.
17. The experience that many people have had of mistaking a store mannequin for a real person can be explained, for instance, in terms of this concept of the body as expression. These plastic models are made very carefully in order to mimic the postures assumed by actual people in similar situations. They are made to look as though they are moving, as though they are looking into the distance. By comparison, the body of a recently dead person, though much more similar to a living body than a mannequin is physically speaking, is not very easily mistaken for a living body. And it is not that we project an inner mental life into the mind of the mannequin, either. The body of the mannequin mimics a perceptual connection with the world, whereas a corpse does not.
18. *Ideas II*, p. 246.
19. "Animals or creatures are like us subjects of a life of consciousness in that in certain ways an envioning world is given to them as theirs in a certainty of being." Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat: Dritter Teil* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 177. See also pp. 162-170 where he discusses this issue in some detail. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl mentions in passing that animals are experienced as anomalous subjects or "variations of my humanness". *Cartesianische Meditationen*, p. 129.
20. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., Inc., 1958), p. 98e.
21. *Ideas II*, p. 247.
22. I read an earlier draft of this paper at the 1989 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. I would like to thank my commentator Tom Nenon for his insights. I would also like to thank the Research Time Awards Committee of Long Island University, Brooklyn for their support.